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Intra-couple income distribution and subjective well-
being: the moderating effect of gender norms 
 
Gábor Hajdu – Tamás Hajdu  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between intra-couple income distribution and 
subjective well-being, using nationally representative data from Hungary. We show that the 
association between the woman’s relative income (the woman’s share of the couple’s total 
earnings) and life satisfaction is negative not only for men, but for women as well. Because 
we control for financial disadvantages on the individual and household level, as well as for 
socio-economic and job characteristics of the respondent and their partner, the result can be 
interpreted as the impact of traditional gender roles and the persistence of the traditional 
male breadwinner mentality. In addition, we show that gender norms moderate this negative 
association. Among those with low levels of traditional norms, the woman’s relative income 
has no effect on life satisfaction, whereas among those who prefer traditional gender roles, 
the negative association is stronger. Our results suggest that conflicts between the gender 
norms and the social and economic reality reduce life satisfaction. 
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Háztartáson belüli jövedelemeloszlás és szubjektív 
jóllét: a nemi szerepekkel kapcsolatos értékek hatása 
 
Hajdu Gábor – Hajdu Tamás  
 
 
Összefoglaló 
A tanulmány a háztartáson belüli, partnerek közti jövedelemeloszlás és a szubjektív jóllét 
közti kapcsolatot vizsgálja reprezentatív magyar adatok segítségével. Bemutatjuk, hogy a nő 
relatív jövedelme (a partnerek összes jövedelmén belül a nő jövedelmi aránya) és az élettel 
való elégedettség közti kapcsolat negatív nem csak a férfiak, hanem a nők között is. Mivel az 
egyéni és háztartási szintű gazdasági hátrányokra, valamint a kérdezett és a partnere 
társadalmi-gazdasági jellemzőire és munkájával kapcsolatos változókra is kontrollálunk, az 
eredmények a tradicionális nemi szerepek és a férfiak elsődleges kenyérkereső szerepének 
hatásaként értelmezhetőek. Ezt támasztja alá, hogy a nemi szerepekkel kapcsolatos 
vélemények valóban módosítják a negatív kapcsolatot. A tradicionális nemi szerepeket 
kevésbé preferálók között a nő relatív jövedelme nincs kapcsolatban az élettel való 
elégedettséggel, míg a tradicionális nemi szerepeket preferálók körében a negatív kapcsolat 
erősebb. Eredményeink a nemi szerepekkel kapcsolatos elvárások és a társadalmi-gazdasági 
realitás közti konfliktus elégedettséget csökkentő hatására utalnak. 
 
Tárgyszavak: partnerek közti jövedelemeloszlás, élettel való elégedettség, nemi szerepek, 
relatív jövedelem 
 
 
JEL kódok: I31, D10, J16 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last decades, subjective indicators of quality of life have gained growing significance 
in social sciences and social policy (Diener et al., 2009; Dolan and White, 2007; Helliwell et 
al., 2015; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Stiglitz et al., 2009). The impact of income and 
income distribution on subjective well-being is especially widely researched. Evidence about 
the effect of income inequalities (Alesina et al., 2004; Hajdu and Hajdu, 2014; Kelley and 
Evans, 2016; Schröder, 2016), absolute and relative income (Card et al., 2012; Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; D’Ambrosio and Frick, 2012; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005) are well-known results 
of this research field. Although the effect of income comparison and different comparison 
groups are widely studied, intra-couple income distribution is a less researched area. The 
effect of intra-couple income distribution on the partners’ subjective well-being can be 
considered as a special type of comparison that is primarily influenced by the 
partners’ preferred contributions to the household budget and gender norms.    
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between intra-couple income distribution 
and subjective well-being, using nationally representative data from Hungary. Our main 
research question is whether the partners’ subjective well-being is influenced by the intra-
couple income distribution in the household. In addition, we also address the role of gender 
norms in this process. 
This study might be especially interesting because in Hungary the prevalence of 
traditional values and gender roles is high, but in a European perspective the education and 
labor force participation gap between men and women is relatively low. Women’s education 
level is above men’s, and their activity rate is getting closer to men’s. This leads to some 
tension between attitudes/preferences and the economic reality. Analyzing the relationship 
between the woman’s relative income and her partner’s satisfaction provides interesting 
insights about the effect of this tension, which is likely to be growing in the future, unless 
there is a substantial change in gender norms. 
Previous research on this issue used Western European and American data (Ahn et 
al., 2014; Bertrand et al., 2015; Bonke, 2008; Eirich and Robinson, 2016; Furdyna et al., 
2008; Rogers and DeBoer, 2001). It has found mostly negative associations between 
women’s relative income and men’s financial or marital happiness, whereas the results are 
mixed and less conclusive for women. In these papers, the negative associations are 
interpreted as the effect of the “male breadwinner mentality” or gender norms. However, 
most of these studies do not provide explicit empirical evidence: only two papers tested the 
moderating effect of traditional values, and only one of them found a significant impact. 
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The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, previous studies used data mostly 
from Western Europe and from the USA, but evidence from Eastern Europe is still missing, 
although, it is special region regarding traditional gender norms and values (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2003; Lück, 2005). Thus, our results could reveal interesting evidence about the 
dynamics of intra-couple income distribution and subjective well-being in a more traditional 
social environment. Second, the moderating effect of gender norms on the individual level is 
rarely tested. In this study, we analyze whether the association between intra-couple income 
distribution and satisfaction is indeed different for those who prefer equal gender roles and 
those who prefer traditional gender roles. Third, we also investigate how the type of 
relationship (cohabiting vs. marriage) changes the effect of the woman’s relative income.  
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we review the previous literature (Section 2), 
then, we briefly describe gender attitudes and gender gaps in terms of education and labor 
force participation in Hungary (Section 3). In Section 4, we present the data and the 
estimation method. In Section 5, we show our results, and how gender norms moderate the 
results, and lastly, we show the estimations in the subsamples of married and cohabiting 
respondents. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Literature 
One of the well-known results of the literature is that income comparison or relative income 
is an important determinant of subjective well-being (Clark et al., 2009; Clark and Oswald, 
1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005; Senik, 2009). Co-workers and friends are 
considered the most common reference groups, however, some papers analyze the effect of 
within family comparison: the effect of the woman’s relative income on financial satisfaction 
or marital happiness. 
The vast majority of research concentrates on the USA and Western-Europe. Using 
data of 11 Western-European countries, Bonke (2008) found that wives’ financial satisfaction 
increases with their relative earnings, whereas husbands’ financial satisfaction declines the 
more their wife earns. Only in the Scandinavian welfare states do both women and men 
prefer more or less egalitarian intra-household income distribution. Ahn, Ateca-Amestoy, 
and Ugidos (2014) have analyzed Spanish and Danish data concluding that Spanish women’s 
financial satisfaction decreases as their contribution to the household income increases, but 
men are more satisfied the higher their contribution is. They interpret the result as evidence 
of the male breadwinner mentality among Spanish men and women. On the other hand, in 
the Danish sample, where gender attitudes are more egalitarian, they have found that the 
effect of an individual’s share of labor income on financial satisfaction is positive both for 
men and for cohabiting women. 
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Using American married individuals, Rogers and DeBoer (2001) have found that 
married women’s marital happiness and psychological well-being are higher, but married 
men’s psychological well-being is lower when women’s relative contributions to the family 
income are increased. The authors conclude that “it is possible that the persistence of 
breadwinning expectations for men leads them to feel distress when women’s proportional 
contributions increase, regardless of their own ability to contribute resources” (Rogers and 
DeBoer, 2001, p. 470). Using American married couples Bertrand et al (2015), in turn, 
examined how the wife’s relative income affects marital happiness and other indicators of 
marriage quality. They have found that couples where the wife earns more than the husband 
tend to rate their marriage less happy, are more likely to think that their marriage is in 
trouble, and are more likely to report that they have discussed separation over the past year. 
This behavior is consistent with the social norm that “a man should earn more than his wife” 
(Bertrand et al., 2015, p. 572).  
Only two papers provide explicit empirical analysis about the role of traditional values 
in the process of within-household income comparison. Furdyna, Tucker, and James (2008) 
analyzed the relationship between marital happiness and wife-to-husband income ratio in a 
sample of employed American wives. They found that the woman’s higher income was 
strongly associated with lower marital happiness among religious African American wives 
(taking religiosity as an indicator of traditional values) and also among white wives with 
traditional gender values, whereas in other groups the relationship was less negative or was 
insignificant. They interpret the results “as illustrative of the expectations held for male 
economic behavior in traditional conceptions of marriage and the discontent that ensues 
when such expectations are unfulfilled” (Furdyna et al., 2008, p. 341). On the other hand, 
Eirich and Robinson (2016) find that full-time working married American individuals are 
more satisfied with their family’s financial situation when they earn more money than they 
spouse – whether they are women or men. However, the authors have also found that 
traditional gender ideology does not moderate this association, and they conclude that social 
comparison processes (relative deprivation) can trump the traditional prescription of the 
male breadwinning role. 
Evidence on this topic from outside Western-Europe and North-America is scarce, 
despite the fact that gender norms and preferred gender roles are different in other regions 
and countries (Lück, 2005), which might have consequences on the effect of intra-couple 
income comparison on subjective well-being.  
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3.  Gender attitudes and gender gaps in Hungary 
Compared to Europe, in Hungary the acceptance of traditional values and traditional gender 
roles is high (Lück, 2005; Pongrácz, 2006; Takács, 2008). The widespread prevalence of 
traditional roles is reflected by the fact that the Hungarian gap between the employment 
rates of women with and without children under 12 is among the highest in Europe1, i.e. it is 
women who tend to take care of children, which is in accordance with the traditional role 
specialization (European Commission, 2012, p. 37). The traditional attitudes can also be 
illustrated with the data of the 2010 European Social Survey. In Hungary, average agreement 
with two statements regarding gender roles (“When jobs are scarce, men should have more 
right to a job than women”, “A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for 
the sake of her family”) is among the highest in the 27 participating European countries.2  On 
a 5-point scale, 53.5% and 54.0% of Hungarians answered that they “agree” or “strongly 
agree” with the statements, respectively.  
These traditional attitudes seem to have been quite stable over the last twenty years. 
According to International Social Survey Programme data, the agreement with the statement 
“A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family” was 
similar in 1988 and 2012 (40.6% and 43.3%, respectively) and it was relatively high 
compared to other European countries. 
On the other hand, the economic reality seems to be (at least partially) contradicting 
the gender attitudes. The gender wage gap decreased between 1986 and 2003 in Hungary 
(Lovász, 2010).  Men’s and women’s labor market participation rates and their education 
level were becoming increasingly similar over the 20th century. Figure 1 depicts the historical 
educational differences between women and men between 1950 and 2010 and activity rate 
differences between 1996 and 2015. In 1950, men were six times more likely to have a 
university degree than women; while in the 2000s the female/male gap diminished and in 
2010 women have more university degrees than men. Between 1996 and 2015, the ratio of 
activity rate of women and men in the 25-59 age group increased from .75 to .86, which 
means that the female/male activity gap decreased by 15 percent. In sum, in Hungary 
women’s educational levels, skills and economic activity are close or similar to those of men.  
                                                 
1 In 2010, the average gap was 12.1 percentage points in the EU-27, whereas the gap was 28.8 
percentage points in Hungary. 
2 Specifically, it is the highest regarding the first, and seventh regarding the second statement. 
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Figure 1 
Female/male ratio of completed university degree and activity rate 
 
Dashed line: Female/male ratio of completed university degree (individuals above age 
25), 1950-2010. Source: authors’ calculation based on data of Barro - Lee (2013). 
Solid line: female/male ratio in activity rate (individuals aged 25-59), 1996-2015. Source: 
authors’ calculation based on data of Eurostat 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/
data/database). 
 
The tension between gender attitudes and the economic reality is reflected in data 
from European Institute for Gender Equality’s (EIGE) Gender Equality Index Report 
(European Institute for Gender Equality, 2013). While traditional attitudes in Hungary are 
among the strongest in Europe, gender gap indicators related to labor force, the economy and 
education are around or below average in Hungary. For example, Hungary is below the EU-
27 average and has the 14th lowest position regarding the gender gap in average monthly 
earnings. The country is also below the EU-27 average and has the ninth lowest value 
regarding the gender gap in full-time equivalent participation in labor force. The gender gap 
both in the representation on boards of the largest companies and in the central bank’s 
decision-making body is also below average and is in the lowest third among the EU-27 
countries. The gender gap in Hungary regarding the number of those with tertiary education 
is also below average and has the 14th lowest value among the EU-27. 
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Using data from ISSP 1994, Lück (2005) provides additional evidence showing that in 
Eastern-Europe support for traditional gender roles and for female employment is high, 
which can be explained by economic necessities and the experience of socialism, that 
enforced female labor force participation. To sum up, it seems that Eastern-Europe (and 
Hungary) can be regarded as a special region where a significant group of people experience 
tensions between preferred gender roles and the economic reality, or between the cultural 
and structural phenomena of breadwinning (Zuo, 2004). 
4.  Data and empirical strategy 
4.1. Data 
 
We use the 2004-2005 wave of the panel survey Turning Points of the Life Course conducted 
by the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute. This survey is the Hungarian part of a 
European panel survey (Generations and Gender Programme, GGP).  
In this survey, subjective well-being was measured with a global question about life 
quality on an 11-point scale (ranging from 0 to 10): “How satisfied are you with the way your 
life’s worked out up till now?” Income of the respondent, income of her/his partner, and 
household income were measured also with single questions (“If you add up all your income, 
how much is your/your partner’s/your household’s total net income in an average month?”). 
The initial sample size is 13 542. We exclude from the sample respondents who did 
not have a partner (4 657 observations) or lived with a same-sex partner (3 observations). 
Respondents with missing life satisfaction and income variables are also excluded (26 and 
842 observations, respectively). Two observations are excluded because of missing sampling 
weight variable. The final sample size is 8 012. 
Intra-couple income distribution is measured with the woman’s share in the couple’s 
total earnings: 
M
i
W
i
W
i
i
II
I
R

 , 
where 
W
iI  is the woman’s monthly income, 
M
iI  is the man’s monthly income. Thus, iR  is 
the woman’s relative income for individual i. If individual i is male, iR  measures his partner’s 
share in his and his partner’s total income; if individual i is female, iR  measures her share in 
her and her partner’s total income.3 iR  takes the value 1 if only the man has an income; it 
                                                 
3 We will refer to this variable as the woman’s relative income (WRI). 
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takes the value 0 if only the woman has an income; and it takes the value 0.5 if individual 
incomes are equal.  
 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
 
We estimate the following OLS model:  
ii
M
ii
W
iii DRDRS   X3210 , 
where iS  is the life satisfaction of individual i, iR  denotes the woman’s relative income for 
individual i, 
W
iD  and 
M
iD  are indicator variables that take the value 1 for women and men, 
respectively. iX  is a vector of the personal characteristics of individual i.4 
We focus on coefficients 1  and 2  that show the relationship between the woman’s 
share in the couple’s total earnings and life satisfaction for women and men, respectively. A 
negative 1  or 2  coefficient indicates that the higher the woman’s relative income, the lower 
the life satisfaction of the female or male member of the couple. Positive coefficients indicate 
reversed correlation, i.e. satisfaction of the female or male member increasing with the 
increase in the woman’s share of the couple’s earnings. 
The omitted variable bias could be a potential problem in our estimation, since the 
woman’s relative income correlates with several characteristics of the respondent and the 
household that might influence life satisfaction (e.g. health status of the household members, 
absolute income level, working hours). To address this endogeneity concern, in our models 
we use a rich set of control variables. These variables include the individual characteristics of 
the respondent’s and the partner’s: age, squared age, health status, education, labor force 
status, and working hours in the last week, as well as the respondent’s sex and personal 
income. In addition, we control for other characteristics of the household: household income, 
the number of household members under age 18, indicators for health problems of other 
household members, arrears on utility bills in the last 12 months, flat size (square meters in a 
logarithmic form), and settlement type. 
After controlling these variables, 1  and 2  reflect (i) the effect of personal power, 
advantages, and consumption opportunities in the household, and (ii) the effect of failure or 
success of the fulfilment of the prescribed gender roles. The former effect depends on the 
personal contribution to the household budget, i.e. the coefficient on the woman’s relative 
income is supposed to be positive for women and negative for men. On the other hand, 
traditional norms prescribe that the man should earn more than the woman. If a woman’s 
relative income is high, these traditional norms are violated, i.e. the coefficient on the 
                                                 
4 Summary statistics of these variables are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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woman’s relative income is supposed to be negative both for women and men. Thus, 1  
reflects the negative effect of gender norms and the positive effect of personal power, 
advantages, and consumption opportunities for women, whereas 2  reflects the negative 
effect of gender norms and the negative effect of personal power, advantages, and 
consumption opportunities for men.5 Thus, if estimations of 1  and 2  are negative, we can 
interpret the results as the effect of preferred traditional gender roles; if 1  is positive and 2  
is negative, we observe the effect of the woman’s relative income through the channel of 
personal power, advantages, and consumption opportunities in the household. 
5.  Results 
Figure 2 shows the bivariate relationship between women’s relative income and life 
satisfaction for women and men.6 The dashed line depicts women’s satisfaction, and the solid 
line depicts men’s satisfaction. In both groups, life satisfaction decreases the higher the 
woman’s share in the couple’s total earnings.  
Figure 2 
Life satisfaction and women’s relative income 
 
Note: Non-parametric regressions 
                                                 
5 Since we controlled for the effect of individual income, we suppose that the effect of gender roles is 
stronger than the effect of personal power, advantages, and consumption opportunities. Moreover, 
since women do not seem to gain the same advantages from earnings that men do (Steil and Weltman, 
1991; Tichenor, 1999), we can also assume that the effect of personal power, advantages, and 
consumption opportunities is weaker for women than men. 
6 Non-parametric regressions using the lpoly function of Stata. 
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For men, if the woman’s relative income is above 0.5, i.e. when the woman’s income is 
higher than the man’s, the relationship is steeper. The negative correlation for women 
suggests that we might explain the results with the expectations about gender roles. If the 
woman’s income exceeds her husband’s, this might cause distress and conflicts.  
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 1. Model 1 includes only the 
woman’s relative income and the respondent’s sex as right-hand side variables. In this model, 
coefficients on the woman’s relative income are negative. The coefficient is larger in absolute 
terms for male respondents than for female respondents – in accordance with the results of 
Figure 3. Model 2 includes the control variables.7 After controlling for the respondent’s 
characteristics, partner’s characteristics, household’s characteristics, the woman’s relative 
income correlates negatively with life satisfaction both for men and women. The estimated 
coefficient is −0.842 for male respondents, and −0.470 for female respondents. This means 
that if we compare two men with one standard deviation above and below men’s average 
income share (75% vs. 40%), then we obtain a 0.295 point satisfaction difference. A similar 
comparison of two women with a 25% and 60% income share yields a −0.165 point 
difference. 8 
It is worth noting that the woman’s relative income correlates negatively with life 
satisfaction not only for men but also for women, in contrast to results from West-European 
and American samples (Ahn et al., 2014; Bonke, 2008; Rogers and DeBoer, 2001). However, 
our results are similar to those obtained in countries where traditional gender norms are 
stronger (Ahn et al., 2014; Zhang and Tsang, 2012). 
Table 1 
Life satisfaction and women’s relative income, OLS 
  (1)   (2)  
 B 
Robust 
SE 
p B 
Robust 
SE 
p 
Woman × WRI -0.538 (0.179) 0.003 -0.470 (0.231) 0.042 
Man × WRI -1.290 (0.187) 0.000 -0.842 (0.246) 0.001 
Controls No   Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.012   0.172   
N 8012   8012   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: personal income; 
household income; respondent’s sex, age, squared age, education, labor force status, working hours in 
                                                 
7 The detailed results are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
8 The difference is negative because the life satisfaction of a woman with an 0.60 income share is lower 
than the life satisfaction of a woman with an 0.25 income share. 
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the last week, health problems; partner’s age, squared age, education, labor force status, working 
hours in the last week, health problems; number of household members under age 18; number of adult 
household members; health problems of other household members; type of relationship; flat size (in 
logarithmic form); arrears on utility bills in the last 12 months; settlement type. Dummies are included 
for missing regressors. 
 
Since our regression model includes the most important characteristics of the 
partners and the household, in accordance with the previous literature (Ahn et al., 2014; 
Furdyna et al., 2008; Rogers and DeBoer, 2001) we can interpret the negative coefficients as 
the impact of traditional gender norms, i.e. as the impact of the prescription that a man 
should earn more than his partner. These traditional norms imply that the higher the 
woman’s economic contribution the more the man’s breadwinning role is questioned, which 
leads to lower life satisfaction. 
5.1. Robustness of the results 
Next, we test the robustness of the estimations. On the one hand, we use restricted (more 
homogeneous) samples and alternative estimation methods (Table 2), on the other hand, we 
allow a non-linear association between life satisfaction and the woman’s relative income ( 
Figure 3).  
The results obtained from the restricted samples are shown in Table 2. Row 1 includes 
observations where both the respondents and their partner have positive incomes. Then, we 
restrict the sample to 25-60 year-old respondents (Row 2). The next model includes only 
two-person households (Row 3). The estimated coefficients have similar signs and similar 
magnitude to the main results. However, the estimations are less precise in these models 
because of the smaller sample sizes. In Row 4, we estimate an ordered logit model rather 
than OLS specification to show that using this model is more suitable for the ordered nature 
of the dependent variable do not alter the results. We also estimate a Probit-adapted OLS 
(POLS) model (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008) that considers the categorical life 
satisfaction variable as ordinal, and cardinalizes it by assuming that satisfaction is normally 
distributed. Using the cardinalized satisfaction variable, a standard OLS estimation can be 
applied. The result of the POLS approach is shown in Row 5. The overall conclusion of these 
alternative estimation methods is that the association of the woman’s relative income with 
life satisfaction is not altered by these sensitivity analyses.9 
 
 
                                                 
9 The estimated coefficients of the POLS method have a smaller magnitude because the variance of the 
cardinalized satisfaction variable is half the variance of the original variable. 
15 
 
 
Table 2 
Life satisfaction and women’s relative income, robustness analyses, OLS 
  Woman × WRI Man × WRI   
  B SE p B SE p 
Adjusted 
R2 
N 
(1) Both partners have positive income -0.475 (0.270) 0.079 -0.840 (0.281) 0.003 0.173 7616 
(2) Age: 25-60 -0.478 (0.264) 0.070 -0.922 (0.293) 0.002 0.200 5433 
(3) 
Both partners have positive income, 
age: 25-60 
-0. 538 (0.315) 0.088 -0.794 (0.337) 0.018 0.204 5132 
(4) Ordered logit -0. 486 (0.251) 0.053 -0.892 (0.265) 0.001 0.049a 8012 
(5) Probit-adapted OLS -0.242 (0.120) 0.044 -0.423 (0.126) 0.001 0.165 8012 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. WRI: Woman’s relative income. All regressions include the same control 
variables as in Table 1. 
a Pseudo R2 
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Next, we test whether the results remain similar if we allow the relationship between 
life satisfaction and the woman’s relative income to be non-linear. For example, if equal 
contribution is preferred, then we should observe a reverse U-shaped relationship. We check 
this in two ways. First, we include squared terms for the woman’s relative income in the 
models. Second, we replace the original variable with ten categorical variables: they indicate 
if the woman’s relative income is between 0.0 and 0.1, 0.1 and 0.2, … 0.9 and 1.0.  
Figure 3 depicts the results.10 Allowing non-linear effects does not change the main 
conclusion: life satisfaction of both women and men is lower when the woman’s relative 
income is higher, and we do not observe a strong reverse U-shaped relationship. 
Figure 3 
Woman’s relative income by respondents’ sex 
 
 
5.2. Heterogeneity 
 
5.2.1. Preferred gender norms 
 
If our interpretation is correct and the negative coefficients on the woman’s relative income is 
mainly caused by the impact of traditional gender norms, then the estimated coefficients 
should be stronger for those who prefer traditional gender roles and should be weaker (or 
even zero or positive) for those who prefer egalitarian gender roles. The moderating effect of 
                                                 
10 Detailed results are in Table A3 and Table A4 in the Appendix. 
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traditional values has rarely been tested in the literature. Nevertheless, most papers that have 
found that the woman’s relative income had a negative effect interpreted these results as the 
effect of the male breadwinner mentality (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2015; Rogers and DeBoer, 
2001).  
To test the moderating effect of gender norms, we split the sample into two groups by 
gender values. We construct a variable that measures preference for traditional gender roles, 
using respondents’ agreement with the following five statements: 
1. Overall, men make better political leaders than women. 
2. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works. 
3. If parents get divorced, it is better for the child to stay with the mother than with 
the father. 
4. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women. 
5. Working for pay should be more important for the man, while looking after the 
home and children should be more important for the woman, even if both have 
jobs. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the first four statements on 
a 5-point scale (from 1 – ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 – ‘strongly agree’) and with the fifth 
statement on a 3-point scale (‘disagree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, or ‘agree’). The measure 
of attitudes toward gender norms is created as a principal component of these five variables.11 
Then using this new variable, we divide the sample into two groups: respondents above the 
average, who prefer more traditional gender norms, and respondents with below average 
traditional gender attitudes.12 
We regressed life satisfaction on the woman’s relative income interacted with the 
respondent’s sex and the indicator variables of the two gender norm groups.13 Table 3 reports 
the results. The estimated coefficient for women with below average traditional attitudes is 
close to zero (−0.191), whereas the coefficient for men with below average traditional 
attitudes is considerably smaller than in the whole sample (−0.439). For respondents with 
traditional gender attitudes, the estimated coefficients are considerably higher: −0.807 for 
                                                 
11 The results are similar when the variable is calculated as the mean of the five variables. 
12 We have decided to use this cut point to have a sufficient number of observations in both groups. 
Respondents in the second group have in fact equal or slightly traditional gender norms: when we 
rescale our gender norm variable to the original 1 to 5 scale, 58% of the respondents in this group are 
below the midpoint. The cut point is 3.46 on the original 1 to 5 scale. 
13 Technically, the regression model consists of four three-way-interaction terms: the main effects of 
the sex of the respondent and the gender norm groups (two dummy variables), and the two-way 
interactions between the latter two variables (one interaction term). The direct effect of women’s 
relative income is excluded – as from the main model above. The four three-way-interaction terms 
measure the effect of women’s relative income for those women and men who prefer more equal 
gender roles, among those women and men who prefer more traditional gender roles. 
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women, and −1.116 for men. These coefficients are significantly higher in absolute terms than 
coefficients for respondents with below average traditional gender attitudes both for women 
and men (p-values on the test of equal coefficients are 0.077 and 0.038, respectively).  
These results confirm that preferred gender norms indeed play an important role in 
the explanation of the negative correlation between the woman’s relative income and life 
satisfaction. The woman’s relative income and life satisfaction correlate negatively primarily 
for those who prefer traditional gender roles; however there are zero or insignificant and 
negative correlations for those with more equal gender norms. Our results corroborate the 
finding of Furdyna et al. (2008), who showed that dissatisfaction among those with 
traditional conceptions of gender role ensues when traditional male breadwinning 
expectations are unfulfilled. 
Table 3 
The moderating effect of preferred gender roles, OLS 
 B 
Robust 
SE 
p 
Woman × Traditional attitudes: lower level × WRI -0.191 (0.276) 0.488 
Woman × Traditional attitudes: higher level × WRI -0.807 (0.314) 0.010 
Man × Traditional attitudes: lower level × WRI -0.439 (0.300) 0.143 
Man × Traditional attitudes: higher level × WRI -1.116 (0.286) 0.000 
Controls Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.173   
N 7497   
Dependent variables: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. WRI: Woman’s 
relative income. Controls: same control variables as in Table 1, and additional control variables: 
gender role attitudes, respondent’s sex × gender role attitudes. Dummies are included for missing 
regressors, except of gender role attitudes. 
 
5.2.2. Type of relationship 
 
In a sample of Chinese married women, Zhang and Tsang (2012) found that women married 
to a husband with a lower income were less happy with their marriage than women married 
to a husband with a higher or equal income. However, this result is moderated by being more 
strongly committed to the relationship. Among those with higher commitments, there was no 
correlation between the woman’s relative income and marital happiness, whereas among 
those with lower commitments there was a negative correlation. There is also evidence that 
cohabiters are less committed to their relationship and to their partner (Stanley et al., 2004). 
19 
 
Inspired by these results, we test whether the effect of the woman’s relative income 
differs for cohabiting and married people. If commitment to the relationship and to the 
partner indeed tends to “overwrites” the effect of traditionally prescribed gender roles (and 
the effect of personal power, advantages, and consumption opportunities), then the 
estimated coefficients should be higher (i.e. negative but closer to 0, or positive) for married 
people. We examine this heterogeneity by regressing life satisfaction on the woman’s relative 
income in subsamples of married and cohabiting respondents.  
Table 4 presents the results. The estimated coefficient on the woman’s relative income 
is −0.470 for married women, and −0.641 for married men. The coefficients are significant at 
the 10 percent and at the 5 percent level, respectively. For cohabiting respondents, 
satisfaction correlates more negatively with the woman’s share in the couple’s total earnings: 
the estimated coefficients are −0.673 and −1.644 for women and men, respectively, however 
because of the smaller sample size, the estimations are less precise, and only the latter is 
statistically significant. 
These results suggest that personal commitment might moderate the relationship of 
women’s relative income and life satisfaction. Lack of commitment, i.e. weaker “couple 
identity” or that the partners are less likely to think of “the relationship as a team, in contrast 
to viewing it as two separate individuals” (Stanley and Markman, 1992, p. 596), enhances the 
effect of preferred gender norms. The lower coefficients for married respondents also fit well 
into the literature about the protective characteristics of marriage (Rendall et al., 2011; Ross 
et al., 1990; Wilson and Oswald, 2005).14 
                                                 
14 There are alternative explanations. It is possible that cohabiters prefer one-earner families. 
Cohabiters might respond less supportively to the man’s (relative) income disadvantages. It is also 
possible that cohabiters care more for intra-couple income distribution, i.e. they are more likely than 
married people to compare their income to their partners’ income. However, these alternative 
explanations – especially the latter two – are more or less connected to the main explanation. 
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Table 4 
Life satisfaction and women’s relative income by type of relationship, OLS 
 Marriage Cohabitation 
 B 
Robust 
SE 
p B 
Robust 
SE 
p 
Woman × WRI -0.470 (0.254) 0.065 -0.673 (0.593) 0.257 
Man × WRI -0.641 (0.270) 0.017 -1.644 (0.583) 0.005 
Controls Yes   Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.150   0.243   
N 6951   1061   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. WRI: Woman’s 
relative income. Controls: same control variables as in Table 1. Dummies are included for missing 
regressors. 
 
Next, we analyze the moderating effect of preferred gender roles by type of 
relationship. We run similar models as in Table 3 for the subsamples of married and 
cohabiting respondents. Table 5 shows the results of this exercise. The general pattern is 
similar to the patterns above. Coefficients for those with high levels of traditional attitudes 
are more negative than for those with low levels of traditional attitudes, and coefficients for 
cohabiters are more negative than for married people. For respondents with traditional 
values, the coefficients on the woman’s relative income are large in general, and are larger in 
absolute terms for cohabiters than for married people (−1.529 vs. −0.759 for women, and 
−2.257 vs. −0.903 for men). For respondents with low levels of traditional attitudes, 
estimated coefficients are close to zero and are insignificant (−0.259 for married women, 
0.102 for cohabiting women, and −0.221 for married men). Only the coefficient for 
cohabiting men was negative and significant (−1.310). The significantly negative coefficient in 
this group might be explained by the fact that this coefficient – beside the effect of failure or 
success of fulfilment of prescribed gender roles – also reflects the effect of personal power, 
advantages, and consumption opportunities, that are supposed to be negative for men. 
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Table 5 
The moderating effect of preferred gender roles by type of relationship, OLS 
 Marriage Cohabitation 
 B 
Robust 
SE 
p B 
Robust 
SE 
p 
Woman × Traditional 
attitudes: lower level × WRI 
-0.259 (0.301) 0.389 0.102 (0.768) 0.894 
Woman × Traditional 
attitudes: higher level × WRI 
-0.759 (0.340) 0.026 -1.529 (0.876) 0.081 
Man × Traditional attitudes: 
lower level × WRI 
-0.221 (0.325) 0.496 -1.310 (0.787) 0.096 
Man × Traditional attitudes: 
higher level × WRI 
-0.903 (0.343) 0.008 -2.257 (0.718) 0.002 
Controls Yes   Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.150   0.254   
N 6517   980   
Dependent variables: Life satisfaction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. WRI: Woman’s 
relative income. Controls: same control variables as in Table 1, and additional control variables: 
gender role attitudes, respondent’s sex × gender role attitudes. Dummies are included for missing 
regressors, except of gender role attitudes. 
6.  Summary 
Using nationally representative data from Hungary, we have examined the association 
between intra-couple income distribution and subjective well-being. On the one hand, in 
Hungary the acceptance of traditional values and the prevalence of traditional gender roles is 
high compared to Europe. On the other hand, the support for female employment, labor force 
participation and relative education of women is also (relatively) high, providing some 
tension between attitudes and the economic reality, or in other words between the cultural 
and structural sides of equality between women and men.  
We have shown that the association between the woman’s relative income (the 
woman’s share of the couple’s total earnings) and life satisfaction is negative for both men 
and women. Because we control for financial disadvantages on the individual and household 
level, the socio-economic and job characteristics of the respondent and their partner, we can 
interpret the results as the impact of traditional gender roles and the widespread prevalence 
of the traditional male breadwinner mentality in Hungary. The higher the woman’s economic 
contribution the more the man’s breadwinning role is questioned, which leads to lower life 
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satisfaction. These results are in line with the findings of previous research based on data 
from countries with traditional gender norms (Ahn et al., 2014; Zhang and Tsang, 2012). 
We have also shown that gender norms moderate the negative association. For those 
with low levels of traditional gender attitudes, the woman’s relative income is not associated 
with life satisfaction, whereas for those who prefer traditional gender roles, the negative 
association is stronger. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that gender norms 
explain the negative coefficients. Respondents with traditional values feel distress and 
dissatisfaction when a woman’s proportional contribution increases and the man’s 
breadwinning role is questioned. 
Comparing married and cohabiting respondents, we have found significant 
differences between the effects of the woman’s relative income. The coefficients were larger 
in absolute terms for cohabiting respondents, which suggests that personal commitment 
might moderate the effect.  
Tension between gender norms and the economic reality is likely to be growing in the 
future, unless there is a substantial change in gender norms. The implications of our results 
relate to this tension. First, our paper might contribute to understanding why Eastern 
Europeans (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009; Sanfey and Teksoz, 2007), and more specifically 
Hungarians are dissatisfied (Helliwell et al., 2015; Lelkes, 2006). Our results suggest that the 
widespread prevalence of traditional gender norms in the region contributes to this 
dissatisfaction. Second, there is evidence to suggest that over time a counter-normative 
gender structure (i.e. dual-earner households or strong breadwinning role of women) could 
induce changes in attitudes (Zuo, 2004), however, our results suggest that espousing 
egalitarian attitudes regarding gender roles and breaking down gender stereotypes are 
essential and might increase subjective well-being. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Summary statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Life satisfaction 6.796 1.888 0 10 8012 
Woman’s relative income (%) 0.413 0.169 0 1 8012 
Household income (1000 HUF) 162.7 100.6 3 1500 8012 
Personal income (1000 HUF) 72.1 57.2 0 1000 8012 
Female 0.504 0.500 0 1 8012 
Age 47.8 14.3 21 79 8012 
Education: primary school 0.246 0.431 0 1 8012 
Vocational training school 0.328 0.469 0 1 8012 
High school 0.242 0.429 0 1 8012 
Tertiary school 0.184 0.387 0 1 8012 
Labor force status: Employed 0.494 0.500 0 1 8002 
Self-employed 0.062 0.242 0 1 8002 
Occasional work 0.009 0.096 0 1 8002 
Unemployed 0.043 0.202 0 1 8002 
Retired 0.198 0.398 0 1 8002 
Disability pension 0.096 0.295 0 1 8002 
On maternity leave 0.054 0.225 0 1 8002 
Student 0.002 0.047 0 1 8002 
Other inactive 0.042 0.200 0 1 8002 
Working hours in the last week: 0 hour 0.003 0.053 0 1 4182 
1-34 hours 0.108 0.310 0 1 4182 
35-40 hours 0.585 0.493 0 1 4182 
41 hours or more 0.304 0.460 0 1 4182 
Activity limitation 0.280 0.449 0 1 8007 
Partner's age 47.8 14.5 15 91 7985 
Partner' education: primary school 0.241 0.427 0 1 8012 
Vocational training school 0.322 0.467 0 1 8012 
High school 0.253 0.435 0 1 8012 
Tertiary school 0.184 0.388 0 1 8012 
Partner's labor force status: Employed 0.455 0.498 0 1 8012 
Self-employed 0.072 0.259 0 1 8012 
Occasional work 0.012 0.109 0 1 8012 
Unemployed 0.043 0.202 0 1 8012 
Retired 0.224 0.417 0 1 8012 
Disability pension 0.098 0.297 0 1 8012 
On maternity leave 0.055 0.228 0 1 8012 
Student 0.003 0.057 0 1 8012 
Other inactive 0.038 0.191 0 1 8012 
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Partner's working hours in the last week: 0 hour 0.000 0.000 0 0 4256 
1-34 hours 0.084 0.278 0 1 4256 
35-40 hours 0.602 0.489 0 1 4256 
41 hours or more 0.313 0.464 0 1 4256 
Partner's activity limitation 0.108 0.311 0 1 7976 
Household was unable to pay utility bills in the last 12 
months 
0.146 0.353 0 1 7997 
Adult household members (in addition to the respondent 
and her/his partner): 1 
0.620 0.485 0 1 8012 
Adult household members: 2 0.234 0.424 0 1 8012 
Adult household members: 3 0.115 0.319 0 1 8012 
Adult household members: 4 or more 0.030 0.172 0 1 8012 
Household members under 18: 0 0.578 0.494 0 1 8012 
Household members under 18: 1 0.202 0.402 0 1 8012 
Household members under 18: 2 0.153 0.360 0 1 8012 
Household members under 18: 3 0.049 0.217 0 1 8012 
Household members under 18: 4 or more 0.017 0.128 0 1 8012 
Ln(Dwelling size - m2) 4.356 0.381 2.996 5.991 7961 
Other household member's activity limitation 0.045 0.207 0 1 7976 
Budapest (capital) 0.139 0.346 0 1 8012 
City 0.512 0.500 0 1 8012 
Village 0.348 0.477 0 1 8012 
Traditional attitudes: higher level 0.502 0.500 0 1 7497 
 
Table A2  
Life satisfaction and women’s relative income, OLS 
 (1)   (2)   
 B 
Robust 
SE 
p B 
Robust 
SE 
p 
Woman × WRI -0.538 (0.179) 0.003 -0.470 (0.231) 0.042 
Man × WRI -1.290 (0.187) 0.000 -0.842 (0.246) 0.001 
Woman -0.047 (0.115) 0.684 0.056 (0.194) 0.771 
Household income    0.002 (0.000) 0.000 
Personal income    0.001 (0.001) 0.192 
Type of relationship: marriage    0.532 (0.067) 0.000 
Age    -0.063 (0.017) 0.000 
Age squared    0.001 (0.000) 0.001 
Education (ref. cat.: Primary)       
Vocational training school    0.047 (0.065) 0.472 
High school    0.117 (0.070) 0.095 
Tertiary    0.310 (0.080) 0.000 
Labor force status (ref. cat.: Employed)       
Self-employed    -0.110 (0.076) 0.149 
Occasional work    -0.730 (0.263) 0.006 
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Unemployed    -0.710 (0.153) 0.000 
Retired    -0.124 (0.126) 0.324 
Disability pension    -0.412 (0.129) 0.001 
On maternity leave    -0.051 (0.148) 0.732 
Student    -0.169 (0.365) 0.643 
Other inactive    -0.301 (0.157) 0.055 
Working hours in the last week (ref. cat.: 1-34 
hours) 
      
0 hour    0.652 (0.471) 0.167 
35-40 hours    -0.222 (0.092) 0.016 
41 hours or more    -0.229 (0.099) 0.021 
Activity limitation    -0.511 (0.055) 0.000 
Partner's age    -0.030 (0.015) 0.046 
Partner's age squared    0.000 (0.000) 0.036 
Partner's education (ref. cat.: Primary)       
Vocational training school    0.098 (0.065) 0.130 
High school    0.178 (0.071) 0.013 
Tertiary    0.217 (0.081) 0.007 
Partner's labor force status (ref. cat.: 
Employed) 
      
Self-employed    0.205 (0.075) 0.006 
Occasional work    0.017 (0.207) 0.934 
Unemployed    -0.139 (0.154) 0.367 
Retired    0.117 (0.125) 0.348 
Disability pension    0.222 (0.131) 0.090 
On maternity leave    0.202 (0.142) 0.155 
Student    0.522 (0.347) 0.132 
Other inactive    -0.126 (0.159) 0.430 
Partner's working hours in the last week (ref. 
cat.: 1-34 hours) 
      
35-40 hours    0.016 (0.100) 0.871 
41 hours or more    0.040 (0.107) 0.704 
Partner's activity limitation    -0.256 (0.081) 0.002 
Household was unable to pay utility bills in the 
last 12 months 
   -0.633 (0.066) 0.000 
Adult household members (in addition to the 
respondent and her/his partner)(ref. cat.: 1) 
      
Adult household members: 2    -0.204 (0.052) 0.000 
Adult household members: 3    -0.135 (0.071) 0.055 
Adult household members: 4 or more    -0.090 (0.125) 0.473 
Household members under 18 (ref. cat.: 0)       
Household members under 18: 1    0.012 (0.057) 0.837 
Household members under 18: 2    -0.031 (0.066) 0.640 
Household members under 18: 3    -0.209 (0.111) 0.060 
Household members under 18: 4 or more    -0.061 (0.200) 0.760 
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Ln(Dwelling size - m2)    0.617 (0.064) 0.000 
Other household member's activity limitation    -0.056 (0.097) 0.566 
Settlement (ref. cat.: Village)       
Budapest (capital)    0.027 (0.073) 0.713 
City    0.073 (0.047) 0.117 
Constant 7.195 (0.082)  6.910 (0.196) 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.012   0.172   
N 8012   8012   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Dummies are included for 
missing regressors. 
 
Table A3 
Life satisfaction and women’s relative income, allowing non-linear effects, OLS 
 B Robust SE p 
Joint p-
value 
Woman × WRI -1.232 (0.567) 0.030 
0.044 
Woman × WRI - squared 0.862 (0.580) 0.137 
Man × WRI -0.615 (0.590) 0.298 
0.003 
Man × WRI - squared -0.269 (0.632) 0.670 
Controls Yes    
Adjusted R2 0.172    
N 8012    
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: same control variables 
as in Table 1. Dummies are included for missing regressors. 
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Table A4 
Life satisfaction and women’s relative income, categorical variables, OLS 
 B Robust SE p 
Woman × WRI: 0.0-0.1 0.316 (0.171) 0.065 
Woman × WRI: 0.1-0.2 -0.073 (0.166) 0.661 
Woman × WRI: 0.2-0.3 0.251 (0.102) 0.014 
Woman × WRI: 0.3-0.4 -0.076 (0.082) 0.357 
Woman × WRI: 0.4-0.5 ref.   
Woman × WRI: 0.5-0.6 -0.171 (0.076) 0.025 
Woman × WRI: 0.6-0.7 -0.218 (0.135) 0.105 
Woman × WRI: 0.7-0.8 -0.182 (0.208) 0.382 
Woman × WRI: 0.8-0.9 -0.317 (0.335) 0.344 
Woman × WRI: 0.9-1.0 -0.020 (0.263) 0.939 
Man × WRI: 0.0-0.1 0.174 (0.173) 0.315 
Man × WRI: 0.1-0.2 0.083 (0.140) 0.553 
Man × WRI: 0.2-0.3 0.018 (0.111) 0.873 
Man × WRI: 0.3-0.4 -0.005 (0.087) 0.958 
Man × WRI: 0.4-0.5 ref.   
Man × WRI: 0.5-0.6 -0.252 (0.082) 0.002 
Man × WRI: 0.6-0.7 -0.201 (0.138) 0.146 
Man × WRI: 0.7-0.8 -0.432 (0.193) 0.025 
Man × WRI: 0.8-0.9 -0.165 (0.371) 0.657 
Man × WRI: 0.9-1.0 -0.616 (0.333) 0.064 
Controls Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.173   
N 8012   
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. WRI: Woman’s relative income. Controls: same control variables 
as in Table 1. Dummies are included for missing regressors. 
